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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
GUS H. SMALL, as and onJy as 
Administrative Trustee of the Trust for 
Richard Charles Bunzl and His Lineal 
Descendants, The Trust for Suzanne Irene 
Bunzl and Her Lineal Descendants, and The 
Trust for the Lineal Descendants of Walter 
Henry Bunzl; BUNZL TRUSTS 
INVESTMENTS, LLC f/k/a Coronado 
Investments, LLC; and BUNZL TRUST 




WILLIAM C. LANKFORD, JR. and 
MOORE STEPHENS, TILLER, LLC, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 
20 l 6CV280892 
Bus. Case Div. 4 
ORDER REGARDING EXPERT DISCOVERY DISPUTE 
The above styled matter is before the Court on a discovery dispute raised in 
correspondence submitted to the Court regarding expert discovery. Specifically, Plaintiffs have 
asserted objections to the following requests for the production of documents included in a 
Subpoena Duces Tecum served upon Mary Radford, a testifying expert retained by Plaintiffs in 
this action: 
Request 6: Your entire file related to your expert engagement in the 
above-styled lawsuit. 
Request 7: Any and all correspondence (including emails, letters, text 
messages, phone calls, etc.) you exchanged with counsel, parties, 
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witnesses, and non-parties pertaining to your engagement in the above- 
styled lawsuit. 
Request 10: Any drafts or working copies of any reports, memorandum, 
or any other written report or summary of your opinions you formed in 
your engagement in the above-styled lawsuit. 
Request 11: Any and all written reports, opinions, drafts, summaries, 
expert reports, or other memoranda you have drafted related to your 
opinions or review of issues present in the above-styled lawsuit. 
("Disputed Expert Requests"). 
In their response to the Disputed Expert Requests, Plaintiffs object on the basis they seek 
"privileged opinion work product."! In correspondence exchanged between counsel and 
submitted to the Court, Plaintiffs take the position that "[a]ny memoranda or drafts prepared by 
Ms. Radford, or provided to Ms. Radford is protected by attorney work product" Related to this 
discovery dispute Plaintiffs have also submitted privilege logs for correspondence, emails and 
memoranda/research that have been withheld from production, referencing documents that 
predate the filing of this action. 
"The Georgia Civil Practice Act provides for 'discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.'" McKinnon v. 
Smock, 264 Ga. 375, 376, 445 S.E.2d 526, 527 (1994) (citing O.C.G.A. §9-l l-26(b)(l)). 
Plaintiffs' counsel's correspondence and privilege logs raise objections to the Disputed Requests 
based on attorney client privilege and the work product doctrine. Notably, 
the purpose of the work-product doctrine is different from that of the 
attorney-client privilege. While the attorney-client privilege is intended to 
protect the attorney-client relationship by protecting communications 
between clients and attorneys, the work-product doctrine directly protects 
the adversarial system by allowing attorneys to prepare cases without 
concern that their work will be used against their clients. 
Plaintiffs' Response and Objection to Subpoena Duces Tecum to Mary Radford, p. 4. 
Letter from Richard A. Wingate to Johannes S. kingma and Shannon M. Sprinkle (dated Oct. 31, 2018). 
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McKesson HBOC Inc. v. Adler, 254 Ga. App. 500, 503, 562 S.E.2d 809, 813 (2002) (citing 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1427-1428 (3rd 
Cir.1991). 
With respect to the assertion of the attorney-client privilege, O.C.G.A. §24-5-501 (a)(2) 
"exclude[s] from evidence on grounds of public policy ... [c]ommunications between attorney and 
client." Accordingly, only confidential communications between a party's counsel and their 
client are covered under the privilege. Further, "[t]he attorney-client privilege extends only to 
confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services 
to the client." S. Guar. Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Ash, 192 Ga. App. 24, 28, 383 S.E.2d 579, 583 
(1989). See also Georgia Cash Am., Inc. v. Strong, 286 Ga. App. 405, 413, 649 S.E.2d 548, 555 
(2007) ("[A party's] suggestion that the fact that an attorney might have reviewed or commented 
upon a document automatically protects the document under the attorney-client privilege is 
unsupported by any authority and, in fact, conflicts with prior opinions by this Court"). 
As to the work product doctrine, O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-26(b)(3) provides: 
Subject to paragraph (4) of this subsection [related to expert discovery], a 
party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise 
discoverable under paragraph (I) of this subsection and prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that 
other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking 
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his 
case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial 
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such 
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall 
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party 
concerning the litigation. 
See also McKinnon v. Smock, 264 Ga. 375, 381 n. 2, 445 S.E.2d 526, 530 (1994) ("'Opinion 
work product' has been described as including such items as an attorney's legal strategy, 
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intended lines of proof, evaluation of the case's strengths and weaknesses, and the inference 
drawn from interviews of witnesses") (citing Sporck v. Peil. 759 F.2d 312,316 (3rd Cir.1985)). 
However, O.C.G.A. §9-l l-26(b)(3) is "subject to" paragraph 4 of §9-11-26 which 
governs expert discovery and authorizes parties to obtain "[ d]iscovery of facts known and 
opinions held by experts ... acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial", that is 
otherwise discoverable, through a variety of methods including the production of documents. As 
to the interplay between O.C.G.A. §9-l l-26(b)(3) and O.C.G.A. §9-l I-26(b)(4) and having 
considered the Disputed Expert Requests at issue in the case at bar, the Court finds McKinnon 
instructive: 
Determining whether correspondence from an attorney to an expert is 
protected from disclosure requires an evaluation of the interplay between 
O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-26(b)(3), which protects opinion work product, and 
O.C.G.A. § 9-l 1-26(b)(4), which perm.its discovery of the facts known 
and opinions held by an expert ... Section 9-11-26(b)(3) and (b)(4) appear 
in conflict when, as here, a party seeks material which originated with the 
attorney representing the opposition and which may contain facts relied on 
by the expert ... 
The protection afforded opinion work product creat[ es] an environment in 
which counsel [is] free to think dispassionately, reliably, and creatively 
both about the law and the evidence in the case and about which strategic 
approaches to the litigation are likely to be in [his] client's best 
interests ... The protection shields an attorney's preparation from disclosure 
because there is a "higher value" to be served in protecting the thought 
processes of counsel ... 
With these principles in mind, we conclude that (b )(3) is "subject to" 
(b )( 4) only to the extent of the first sentence of (b )(3 ). That is, one seeking 
discovery of the facts known and opinions held by an expert acquired or 
developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial may do so without 
exhibiting a substantial need for the material and establishing the undue 
hardship that will result should the seeker have to employ other means to 
develop the evidence. However, discovery seeking the facts known and 
opinions held by the expert is subject to (b)(3)'s provision against the 
disclosure of "the mental impressions, conclusions, opinion, or legal 
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation." Thus, correspondence from an attorney to an expert is 
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protected from disclosure to the extent that the correspondence contains 
the opinion work product of the attorney. Should a dispute arise over 
whether a particular document does contain protected work product 
material, the trial court must conduct an in camera review to ensure that 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's 
attorney or representative are not disclosed. 
McKinnon, 264 Ga. at 376-78 (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Stephens v. Tr. For 
Pub. Land, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("Plaintiff argues that the materials 
withheld constitute privileged work product because Mr. Dabney was operating, not in his 
capacity as Plaintiffs expert, but rather in his capacity as consultant. While the Court appreciates 
the distinction Plaintiff attempts to draw, courts have generally held that where an individual 
serves as both an expert and as a consultant, documents which are related to the expert's role as 
an expert must be produced, and that any ambiguity as to the role played by the expert when 
reviewing or generating documents should be resolved in favor of the party seeking discovery"). 
Importantly, the burden of establishing the existence of a privilege rests on the party 
asserting the privilege. See Georgia Cash Am., Inc. v. Strong, 286 Ga. App. 405,412,649 S.E.2d 
548, 554 (2007); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Conkle, 226 Ga. App. 34, 46, 486 S.E.2d 180, 191 
(1997). Moreover, Uniform Superior Court Rule 5.5 provides: 
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming 
that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial 
preparation material, the patty shall: 
a. Expressly make the claim; and 
b. Describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible 
things not produced or disclosed and do so in a manner that, without 
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other 
parties to assess such claim. 
(Emphasis added). 
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Here, having considered the correspondence exchanged between counsel and the large 
number of documents being withheld according to the privilege logs provided, the breadth of the 
assertion of the attorney-client and work product privileges in this case is troubling and raises a 
concern that the analysis that went into the assertion of the privileges was not very thorough. 
Similarly, on their face the scope of the Disputed Expert Requests appears broad (e.g., the 
expert's "entire file related to [the] expert engagement", "any and all 
correspondence ... exchanged with counsel", etc.) such that Defendants would be well served to 
consider tailoring their requests to more narrowly state the discoverable documents being 
requested. 
In the final analysis, the distinctions between discoverable expert materials and 
documents protected under the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine are not 
particularly complicated and counsel should be able to make an appropriate distinction. Further, 
motions to compel what ultimately may be a sizeable number of documents could prove to be 
time consuming and very expensive for all parties, Indeed, if Defendants have to file motions to 
compel and the Court finds a privilege was not properly asserted as to a large number of 
documents, the case for an award of attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. §9-11-37 would likely be a 
strong one. 
Given all of the above and in an effort to promptly and more efficiently address this 
discovery dispute, the Court orders as follows: 
Defendants, within five (5) days of the entry of this order, shall reconsider and, if/as 
necessary, tailor their Disputed Expert Requests. 
Thereafter and within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this order, Plaintiffs/Ms. 
Radford, shall supplement their production and/or amend and supplement their 
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related privilege logs with the guidance of and in accordance to the above legal 
authorities, including describing the nature of the documents or communications 
being withheld with sufficient detail to enable the other parties and the Court to assess 
the privilege claimed with respect to each document withheld from production. 
Thereafter if any dispute remains as to the expert discovery sought following 
Plaintiffs/Ms. Radford's supplemental production and/or amended/supplemented 
privilege logs, counsel for the patties shall meet and confer within thirty (30) days of 
the entry of this order. 
If any dispute remains as to the expert discovery sought following such conferral, 
Defendants may thereafter, if they deem it necessary, proceed with a motion to 
compel as appropriate. If necessary, disputed documents shall be submitted to the 
Court for in camera review. 
SO ORDERED thi~day of November, 2018. 
0 ~·~ ~- ~ J NJ. GOER,JUDG 
F; to:ounty Superior Court 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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